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NOTES AND COMMENTS
in the lower court's.opinion: "[Erie R. R. v: Tompkins] did not in any
way alter the wholly distinct doctrine relating to equitable remedial
rights.... There is no doubt that today, as before Erie R. R. Co. v.
Tompkins, a federal court sitting in a given state will, for instance,
refuse to appoint a receiver at the suit of an -unsecured creditor although
the statute of that state authorizes such an action." 40
In any event, even if the doctrine of equitable remedial rights has
been abolished, the litigant in a federal diversity jurisdiction case must
still resolve the general dilemma of "substance" and "procedure."
HENRY E. COLTON.
Habeas Corpus-A Method of Federal Review of State Decisions?
There has been an increasing number of applications for writs of
habeas corpus in the federal courts -to review the administration of
justice by the state courts. Such applications present a complex prob-
lem to the federal judge. He is torn between the traditional reluctance
of the federal courts to interfere with the states' administration of jus-
tice and the urgent desire to assure an accused of a fair trial.
In Stonebreaker v. Smyth,' recently decided by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals; the problem was aptly illustrated. The appellant,
Stonebreaker, was serving a sentence of fifty years in the Virginia
State Penitentiary, imposed by a Virginia court in 1931 upon pleas of
guilty to three indictments charging armed robbery. In 1943, Stone-
breaker had presented his petition for writ of habeas corpus to the trial
court, alleging that he had been denied due process of law guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, in that, at
the time he was sentenced he was a minor twenty years of, age, ignorant
and uinformed as to his right to counsel, and incapable of representing
himself, and that he had pleaded guilty because of a confession that
had. been unfairly obtained from him. After full hearing on the merits,
the trial court discharged the writ and dismissed the petition; and a writ
of error was denied by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
Then, in 1944, an application for writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court was denied.2
After more than two years, the petitioner filed his petition for writ
of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, relying on the identical grounds urged in the state
court in 1943. The district court, relying on White v. Ragen,3 dismissed
the petition without an examination into the substance of the allegations,
,York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F. 2d 503, 522 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
163 F. 2d 498 (C. C. A. 4th 1947).
2 Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 323 U. S. 754 (1944).
324 U. S. 760 (1944).
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on the ground that the matter had been fully heard in the state courts
on habeas corpus and that the Supreme Court of the United States had
denied certiorari.
On appeal, the circuit court, in a two to one decision, affirmed the
decision of the district court, also relying on White v. Ragen and upon
Ex parte Hawk.4
Before going into the actual decision of the district and circuit courts,
a review of some of the basic rules governing the issuance of writs of
habeas corpus by the federal courts may be of some value.
There is no doubt that a writ of habeas corpus may be granted by
a federal court to a prisoner held or imprisoned by state authority,
where he is in cust6dy in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States.5 But there are certain guiding. rules -which have been
set out to govern the. federal courts in passing upon such applications
for habeas corpus. Some of these rules follow:
1. Federal courts should be hesitant about any interference with the
administration of justice in the state courts, and, except in "rare" cases
of "peculiar urgency," should not entertain petitions for habeas corpus,
unless it clearly appears that the petitioner has exhausted his remedies
.in the courts of the state.6
Just what cases present circumstances of "peculiar urgency" so as
to justify a federal courts' intervention prior to an exhaustion of state
remedies obviously cannot be stated within any precise boundaries.
Whether or not the particular case presents such circumstances must,
of course, depend upon its own facts.7
' 321 U. S. 114 (1943).
'Rv. STAT. §§751 et seq. (1875), 28 U. S. C. §§451-455 (1940).
6 White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1944) ; House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1944) ;
x parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1943) ; Ex parte Davis, 318 U. S. 412 (1943) ;
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935); Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179
(1907) ; Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 (1885).
"In Potter v. Dowd, 146 F. 2d 244 (C. C. A. 7th 1944), allegations that the
petitioner had been denied counsel in a trial for rape, was too poor to employ one,
was a man of little education and that a confession had been obtained by duress,
were held sufficient to warrant the intervention of a federal district court on
petition for habeas corpus, prior ta an exhaustion of state remedies.
In Mitchell v. Youell, 130 F. 2d 880 (C. C. A. 4th 1942), where the petitioner
was serving a sentence of 18 years imposed by a state court upon a conviction
of burglary, a hearing on habeas corpus in the district court had disclosed that the
accused was illiterate, had no funds to employ counsel and none was appointed for
him. The state criminal court judge had testified at the hearing that he had
thought during the trial that the accused was being represented by counsel of
his codefendants, and that he would not have sentenced the accused to more than
two years had jury trial been waived. It also appeared that jury trial could not
be waived, by state law, except where the defendant was represented by counsel.
The circuit court held that the petitioner was entitled to relief by habeas corpus
in the federal courts, but did not mention that it did not appear that the petitioner
had sought review of the state court's denial of relief by the Unied States Supreme
Court.
In Jones v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 97 F. 2d 335 (C. C. A. 6th 1938),
the petitioner had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death and had
[Vol. 26
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2. The usual remedies to be exhausted in the state courts are what-
ever review is provided by the states and any proceeding in the nature
of habeas corpus,0 including a writ of error coram nobis, if that is the
prescribed state remedy.10
3. On adverse decision of the highest state court on his petition for
writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner, if dissatisfied, must have sought
to have that decision reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United
States by appeal or certiorari, else his state remedies are not so far.
exhausted as to permit the filing of a petition for habeas corpus in a
federal district court."1
4. After the petitioner has exhausted his- state remedies, including
application for review by appeal or certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, his petition for habeas corpus may then be entertained
by a federal district court. But at this point, the petitioner is con-
fronted with the rule relied upon in the principal case: "Where the
state courts have adjudicated the merits of his contentions, and this
[United States Supreme] Court has either reviewed or declined to
review the state court's decision, a federal court will not ordinarily re-
examine upon habeas corpus the questions thus adjudicated."'12
appealed and petitioned for new trial in the state courts. His petitions for habeas
corpus and writ of error coram nobis to the highest state court on grounds that
his counsel had not been granted adequate time to prepare his defense at trial
and that he had newly discovered evidence that he was convicted on perjured testi-
mony, had been denied on jurisdictional grounds. And, at the hearing on habeas
corpus, the Attorney General of Kentucky stated that he was "strongly inclined
to the view that Tom Jones was convicted on perjured testimony." These were
held sufficiently peculiarly urgent circumstances to warrant the interference by the
district court on habeas corpus, although no application had been made to the
United States Supreme Court for review of the state, court decisions.
In Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F. 2d 586 (C. C. A. 5th 1931), a prisoner, who
was under sentence to be executed within two days and who could not make appli-
cation to the proper state court which would not hold regular term for some time,
was held entitled to habeas corpus by a federal court without exhaustion of his
state remedies.
In Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459 (1900), it was held that the detention
by state authority of a federal revenue officer whose presence at his post of duty
was important to the public welfare presented a case of such urgency as to war-
rant the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the federal court, even before final
action by the state court.
8 Ex parte Davis, 318 U. S. 412 (1943). But cf. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S.
471, 477 (1944), wherein it was said, in a case where denial of counsel was the
alleged violation of the Constitutional rights, that: "Heretofore we have not con-
sidered a failure to appeal an adequate defense to habeas corpus in this type of
case ...the failure to appeal only emphasizes the need of counsel." Smith v.
O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329 (1940).
' Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935).
20 Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1943).
"See White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760, 764 (1944) ; Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S.
114, 117 (1943) ; Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179, 181, 182 (1906).
"See White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760, 764-765 (1944); House v. Mayo, 324
U. S. 42, 48 (1944); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 118 (1943); Salinger v.
Loisel, 265, U. S. 224. 230-232 (1923) ; United States ex rel. Parker v. Carey, 135
F. 2d 205 (C. C. A. 7th 1943).
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There are "exceptions" to the latter rule, in that, if the state affords
no remedy,'3 or if, in the particular case, the remedy is inadequate or
in practice unavailable, 14 a denial of certiorari by the United States
Supreme Court does not preclude a re-examination by the federal dis-
trict court upon habeas corpus. 15 These are not actually exceptions to
the rule, for, if the state affords no remedy, or if in the particular case
the remedy is inadequate or in practice unavailable, the state courts
have not "adjudicated the merits of his contentions" within the meaning
of the rule. Obviously, if the state courts' denial of habeas corpus is
based on the ground that no such remedy is available under state law,
or that the contentions of the petitioner were not properly presented,
or upon some other adequate non-federal ground, the denial of certiorari
by the Supreme Court of the United States is based merely on the
ground that it has no' jurisdiction to review, and can have no bearing
on the merits of the petitioner's contentions. 16
If the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court is
grounded upon want of jurisdiction, then the federal district court may
entertain the petition for habeas corpus. But even then, in the usual
case, there will remain some other state court remedy which has not
been exhausted; so that the district court might dismiss the petition on
that ground.
The net result of the above decisions appears to be that, when the
remedy of habeas corpus is readily available in the courts of the state,
as it is in Virginia,'7 a federal district court is not justified in inter-
fering with state custody by the issuance of habeas corpus, except in
those "rare cases" of "peculiar urgency," in which cases the interference
may be procured prior to an exhaustion of the state remedies. This for
the reason that, until the petitioner has first exhausted his remedies in
the state courts and has sought review in the United States Supreme
Court, a federal district court is not justified in issuing habeas corpus;
'3 House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1944) where the Florida Supreme Court had
denied a writ of error from petitioner's conviction, an application for leave to
file a corarn nobis proceeding, and three petitions for habeas corpus, all without
a hearing and on the ground that the remedies sought were not appropriate to
the Florida state law. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 115 (1934).
" White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760 (1944) where the Missouri Supreme Court
had dismissed the petitions for habeas corpus without requiring an answer and
without a hearing, and without an opinion, save an announcement that: "Any
petition which raises a question of fact only will not be considered." The United
States Supreme Court deemed this an announcement that no petition for habeas
corpus would be entertained by the Missouri Supreme Court unless, on its face, it
precluded any possibility of a trial of any issue of fact in that court.
" See Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 118 (1943).
10See White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760, 765 (1944) ; House v. Mayo, 324 U. S.
42, 49 (1944) ; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471, 477 (1944) ; New York ex rel.
Whitman v. Wilson, 318 U. S. 688, 690 (1942); Woolsey v. Best, 299 U. S. 1, 2
(1936).
17 VA. CODE (1942) §§5848-5861.
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and, after denial of habeas corpus by the state court and a refusal to
review by the United States Supreme Court, the weight of those deci-
sions, while not res judicata,i8 will effectively prevent a federal district
court from proceeding upon an independent inquiry into the very ques-
tions already adjudicated.' 0
In view of this apparent result, there may be a choice facing the
person who is imprisoned by state authority and who alleges a depriva-
tion of his constitutional Tights. If he has a case the facts of which
may possibly be interpreted as presenting circumstances .of "peculiar
urgency"20 and the state courts have "adjudicated the merits of his
contentions," its seems that he should directly petition the federal dis-
trict court for writ of habeas corpus. Then, if the district court should
dismiss the petition on the ground that no review had been sought in
the United States Supreme Court, the petitioner still has the chance
that the United States Supreme Court will grant relief on certiorari or
appeal. However, if he first seeks review by the United States Supreme
Court, and that review is denied, there seems little, if any, hope of his
getting a re-examination by the district court.
If this is the true picture to be gleaned from the stated rules, it
seems clear that, in the principal case, the district court and the majority
of the circuit court were correct in discharging the writ of habeas corpus.
But it is equally apparent that the crux of the question, as pointed out
by Judge Soper, is, what situations are sufficiently extraordinary or
unusual as to justify a re-examination by a federal district court on
habeas corpus of questions adjudicated on the merits by the state courts
and reviewed or declined by the United States Supreme Court? The
writer has been unable to find any cases in which the lower federal
courts have taken it upon themselves to re-examine on habeas corpus
upon such a state of the record. Perhaps the answer to the question
and the reason for the dearth of authority is, as already suggested, that
there are no such extraordinary or unusual situations. Certainly it
seems that, when a person convicted of crime in a state court has pressed
his contentions of a violation of his constitutional rights through the
state courts, has had a full hearing there, and has also sought review by
the United States Supreme Court, it is not too great an assumption
that there is no merit in his contentions. But if that is the anfswer,
IL Ex parte Abernathy, 320 U. .S. 219 (1943) ; Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S.
101 (1942); Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U. S. 224 (1924).
2
0 It should be noted that, while the United States Supreme Court may, by
REV. STAT. §716 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §377 and REv. STAT. §751 et seq. (1875), 28
U. S. C. §§451-455 issue original writs of habeas corpus, that Court will not
ordinarily do so, even after exhaustion of state remedies, before it has been sought
and denied in a district court or denied by a circuit or district court judge. See
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 117 (1943) ; E. parte Ab~rnathy, 320 U. S. 219
(1943)..1' See Note 7 supra.
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why did the United States Supreme Court say that a federal court
would not "ordinarily" re-examine such questions?
In the principal case, the contention of the petitioner was that his
was not an "ordinary" case, within the meaning of the rule because,
since his contentions were passed upon by the state court and since
certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court, decisions
had been handed down by the United States Supreme Court that brought
about a "change or at least a clarification of the law with respect to
the necessity of counsel."2 1  And, he contended, in the light of these
decisions, he was entitled to a rehearing. To this contention the mnajor-
ity of the circuit court replied that the petitioner was probably correct,
but that, since the decisions mentioned could not have been before the
state court at the time his former petition for habeas corpus was pre-
sented, he had not exhausted his state remedies, and should file another
petition in the state court.
Obviously, in this reply of the majority there is a clear recognition
of at least prima facie merit to the petitioner's contentions that he has
been deprived of his constitutional rights. Thus, support is lent to the
conclusion that there are no cases so extraordinary or unusual as to
justify the issuance of habeas corpus by a federal district court after
a full hearing by the state court and a denial of or review by certiorari
or appeal by the United States Supreme Court.
Also, by way of lending support to their decision, the majority of
the circuit court argue that the state courts can give the petitioner relief
more expeditiously than would a reversal of the decision of the district
court, since an application for certiorari "would almost certainly be
made if we were to take the habeas corpus matter out of the hands
of the state courts." 22  Judge Soper, in his dissent, contends that the
circuit court should act immediately, since there is no assurance that
the state court will change its mind. Of course, whether a further
petition to the Virginia courts will result in more immediate relief to
the petitioner depends entirely upon the action of that court.
JOE H. BARRINGTON, JR.
21 De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U. S. 663 (1946); Canzio v. New York, 327
U. S.,82 (1945), rehearing denied, 327 U. S. 816 (1945) ; Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S.
786 (1944)-in all of which cases it was held that a plea of guilty did not neces-
sarily involve an "intelligent waiver" of right to counsel. Tompkins v. Missouri,
323 U. S. 485 (1944) in which it was held that a request for counsel was not
necessary to preserve the right.
2_ Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 163 F. 2d 498, 502 (C. C. A. 4th 1947).
